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HERBERT, HERCULES AND THE PLURAL 
SOCIETY: A “KNOT” IN THE SOCIAL BOND 
“They are playing a game. They are playing at not 
playing a game. I f  I show them I see they are, I 
shall break the rules and they will punish me. 
I must play their game, of not seeing I see the game.” 
THE writing, and reading, of yet another article on the judicial 
process surely requires justification. After all, law is not merely a 
courtroom phenomenon. Have we not for too long ignored or 
trivialised the problems of “ impact,” “ access,” “ enforcement ” 
and “response”? These are indeed priorities but it may yet be 
worthwhile to attempt to place the judicial process in a wider per- 
spective, one which indudes more than court-room, chambers, 
solicitor’s office or even neighbourhood law centre. 
Of course the twin paradoxes-of certainty and change and of 
rules and people-have their awn intellectual fascination and Pro- 
fessor Ronald Dworkin’s recent contributions to the debate have 
raised old questions in interestingly novel ways.a Notably he is 
unwilling to accept simple “ either/or ” distinctions and he has 
given new prominence to the problem of controversy. Nevertheless 
this article argues that controversy has not yet been sufficiently 
emphasised in explanations of the judicial process. The image of 
law as an autonomous system (“ caused by ” or “ reflecting ” social 
conditions in the more trendy accounts) has been too powerfully 
attractive. It suggests a simple dichotomy: on the one hand society, 
its conditions and demands; on the other, the law.’ Further, the 
problem for the judge is reduced to either “ which horse do I ride? ” 
or “ how can I ride both at once?.” In either case there are two, 
and only two, separate horses. 
By contrast, “ society ” may be viewed, not as a coherent unity, 
but as fragmented and deeply divided. On this view the appearance 
of the law as relatively coherent, its ostensable consistency, is prob- 
lematic, and no less so tban the inconsistencies that are the lawyer’s 
more usual concern. To the extent that the law is a product of, and 
largely reproductive of, a particular social ordering, its autonomy 
is less absolute than is often thought. Should not the simple dicho- 
tomy be rejected as a seriously misleading description which is 
1 R. D. Laing, Knots (1971), p. 1. 
2 They are now collected in Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977) (hereafter 
“TRS”); see also Dworkin, “NO Right Answer? ” in Hacker and Raz (eds.), Law, 
Morality and Society (1977), p. 58. 
3 Raymond Williams, Marxism and Literature (1977) argues that many materialist 
and idealist accounts share this tendency to naive dualism (see p. 59). See also 
Campbell, “ Legal Thought and Juristic Values ” (1974) 1 British Journal of Law 
and Society 13 and Aubert; “ Competition and Dissensus: Two Types of Conflict 
and of Conflict Resolution (1963) VII Journal of Conpict Resolution 26 at p. 33 
et seq. 
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consequently unlikely to produce any worthwhile prescription for 
contemporary adjudicators? Regrettably the more complex the 
process the more difficult it is to understand and describe; never- 
theless an explanation’s mere simplicity is ‘insufficient reason for 
postponing inquiry. The broad strategy here adopted is first to look 
at some aspects of social controversy and conflict, then to look at 
their implications for the fundamental notion of legitimacy and 
finally to focus on the role of the individual judge in the “hard 
case,” the kind of case which overtly challenges the ostensible 
consistency and autonomy of the law. 
I. A SENSE OF CRISIS 
In the first of his 1978 Reith Lectures, Professor A. H. Halsey 
referred to “ the oomprehensive proposition that British sosiety 
faces imminent disaster.” A multitude of less comprehensive 
perceptions contribute. Entry into the European Economic C m -  
munities, the devolution debate and the Labour Government’s 
accommodation with organised labour seem to threaten Parlia- 
mentary sovereignty, a once inviolable symbol of the liberal ideal. 
Party politics are seen to be unrepresentative and bankrupt, 
bureaucracy to be vast, inefficient, sometimes oppressive, some- 
times corrupt. Scientific and technological developments seem to 
generate new problems as quickly as they solve old ones. The 
economy cycles ever downwards. In frustration the politics of 
pressure groups and protest have grown rapidly and now involve the 
respectable, articulate and influential as well as the ~nderprivileged.~ 
In these politics obedience to  the law is no longer axiomatic and 
violent confrontations are not infrequent. Racial and religious 
differences are significantly evident where tensions are greatest. 
British society is n d  unique in this respect; in one way or another 
a sense of crisis pervades the western world. 
Our concern here is not with the accuracy of such perceptions. 
For our purposes it matters only that they exist and are widely 
felt. In sum they amount to anxiety that the social bond is badly 
frayed, that the foundations have cracked, that the whole house 
of cards may soon collapse. 
4 The Listener, January 12, 1978, p. 37. 
5 See Halsey, “The Rise of Party,” The Listener, February 2, 1978, p. 144. At 
the Winchester M.3 public inquiry, Mr. John Thorn, the headmaster of Winchester 
College, was ejected for disorderly conduct; sea The Times, h l y  14, 1976. In a 
letter to that paper the previous day, he had said, ‘‘ It is the belief that all this is 
not democracy, is not justice, is not free speech that has prompted the respectable 
citizens of Winchester to behave with such uncharacteristic clamour. It is a dangerous 
weapon they use and they know it.” Mr. C. D. Ellis, an old Wykehamist, replied on 
July 16, 1976, “The tradition of digni5ed restraint and civiliised rationality is one 
which we must look increasingly to our educational institutions to preserve; if they 
cannot, who will?” 
6 See Form, The Death of the Law (1979, Smith, ‘‘ Is there a Prima Facie 
Obligation to Obey the Law? ” (1973) 82 Yale L. J. 950, Kadish and Kadish, 
Discretion to Disobey (1973), Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1972), pp. 363-391, 
Dworkin, TRS, pp. 206-222. 
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In this context “ expressive ” movements like “ modem psyche- 
delic romanticism” are of pmticular interest.‘ Not only does the 
notion that each must “ d o  his own thing,” that each is free to 
‘‘ split,” appear to be a fundamental threat, but the mergence of 
such movements also illustrates the difficulty of simple economic 
explanations fo r  the sense of crisis. It could be argued that such 
deep tensions were absent in 1959 when we could be convinced 
that we had “never had it so good.” Nevertheless the expressive 
movements emerged before the current economic crisis was widely 
appreciated. Gouldner angues that they represent not a protest at 
the failure of a system but the “rejection of success.” He coan- 
ments, “ If a system cannot hold loyalties even when it has accom- 
plished what it set out to do, it would seem that it has arrived at a 
deep level of crisis.” 
We had the promised land in sight and yet were disappointed. 
MateTial plenty and personal desolation seem to go hand in hand. 
The Marcusian proposition that established society buys its own 
success by “ ‘ delivering the goods ’ on an increasingly large scale ” 
cannot explain this. Economic deterioration has probably precip- 
itated the sense of crisis but it is likely that the tensions we now 
see so clearly were present in some latent form in the halcyon days 
of Supermac. Nevertheless it is probably no coincidence that the 
years in which the sense of crisis has grown have also seen a huge 
increase in interest in the ideas of Karl Marx. Some now search 
for “ radical ” solutions, others are deterred by scepticism of the 
achievements af “ socialist States ” in increasing personal freedom 
and by the suspicion that socialism may simply be “ the re-institution 
of the ‘ company town ’ on the level of the nation State.” lo 
11. THE RAW NERVE 
For each individual, in any form of society, there is a tension 
between his need to establish or preserve his own identity and sdf- 
respect and the requirement that he yield personal freedom in 
order to remain a memlber of the society. Different forms of society 
may give greater weight to one or other aspect; for some individuals 
the lbalance struck may seem ideal, for others it may seem oppres- 
sive, but the tension is unavoidable.ll The sense of crisis could thus 
be restated as reluctance on the part of substantial sections of the 
community lto accept the balance formerly struck and which social 
convention seems to demand of them, coupled with a fear, mainly 
7 See Gouldner, l’ Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (1970, pp. 78-80 and 
Kamenka and Tay, Beyond Bourgeois Individualism: The Contemporary Crisis in 
Law and Legal Ideology ’* in Kamenka and Neale (eds.), Feudalism, Capitalism and 
Beyond (1979, p. 1’27, at p. 132. 
8 Gouldner, o p  cif. p. 80. 
9 Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man (1972), p. 12. 
10 Gouldner, The Didectic of Ideology and Technology (1976), p. 165. 
11 See generally Unger, Law in Modern Society (1976). 
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amongst other sections of the community, that no new equilibrium 
will be fwnd.12 
The paradox of social order can be more easily stated in poetic 
terms, for poetry has a transcendental quality. Thus in T. S. Eliot’s 
play about political power, Murder in the Cathedral, Thomas says 
of the fearful chatter of the chorus, 
“ They speak better than they know, and beyond your under- 
They know and do not know, what it is to act or suffer. 
They know and do not know, that action is suffering 
And suffering is action. Neither does the agent suffer 
Nor the patient act. But both are k e d  
In an eternal action, an eternal patience 
To which all must consent that it may lbe willed 
And which all must suffer that they may will it, 
That the pattern may subsist, for the pattern is the action 
And the suffering, that the wheel may turn and still 
Be forever still.’’ l3 
standing. 
Discussion of the poetic, the transcendental, the metaphysical may 
appear unscientific. Nevertheless it is apposite lor several reasons. 
First, to seek transcendental experiences has been a not un- 
common reaction to the sense of crisis. The Psychedelic Culture 
has sought refuge or release in oriental mysticism, drugs and, 
occasionally, m a s  hysteria. Christianity, which has always stated a 
parallel paradox in the doctrine of the simultaneous divine and human 
status of Christ and in sthe notion that, through a life of selflessness, 
the individual may gain for  himself eternal happiness, has recently 
witnessed a wave of so-called “ charismatic ” activity, which, in its 
wilder forms, has involved a resurgence of “ speaking in tongues ” 
and the like.14 
Secondly, there is good reason to doubt the self-sufficiency of 
empiricist theory and the proposition that knowledge depends on 
experience alone. For example, Chomsky’s scientific work in the 
field of linguistics leads him to cite approvingly Peirce’s dictum that 
“ man’s mind has a natural adaptation to imagining correct theories 
of some kinds.” l5 Modern philosophy, although s d g l y  prex>ccupied 
with the analysis of language, gives important places $to imagina- 
tion and intuition.18 Roberto Unger has recently argued that 
“much of social science has been built as a citadel against 
metaphysics and politics. . . . Buft now . . . to resolve its own 
1 2  Halsey, in “The Reconstitution of Status,” The Listener, January 26, 1978, at 
p. 105 says that “we all have the sense that the social contract is being re- 
negotiated.” 
18 (1938), p. 21. See also R. D. Laing, op. cit., p. 82. 
l 4  See Philippians, 11. 5-8, and Romans, 11. 7. Wimberley et al., “ Conversion in 
a Billy Graham Crusade: Spontaneous Event or Ritual Performance?” (1975) 16 
Sociological Quarrerly 162, found evidence. that revival conversions are ritualistic, 
integrative events. 
15 Chomsky, Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (19721, p. 45. 
16 See R. M. Hare, Freedom and Reason (1963), pp. 219-222 and Rawls, op. cit. 
pp. 34-45. 
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dilemmas, social the- must once again become, in a sense, 
both metaphysical and political. It must take a stand on issues 
of human nature for which no ‘scientific ’ elucidation is, or 
may ever be, 
Thirdly, notions of this “ unscientzc ” character are vital to the 
understanding of one aspect of the problem of order. The par- 
ticular (often unequal) sacrifices of personal freedom demanded of 
individuals by their membership of a society are rendered more or 
less acceptable, not merely by the perceived (unequal) lbenefits of 
community membership, but also by processes of ideological 
explanatiion and mystification f r m  which ideas about the legal 
system cannot be separated. We may desire a “ pure science ” of 
law, but we are bound therein to be frustrated.18 
111. THE LIBERAL IDEAL 
Societies of all the major typesl9 must cope with some degree of 
consciousness of Ithe tensions between individual and community 
interests. Such tensions are least prablematic in “ tribal ” society 
where human experience lacks the variety necessary fully to alert 
the critical faculty.zo Nevertheless, in all societies, to the extent that 
the tension is perceived, so idealogy must purport to explain or 
serve to distract.21 The identification by dominant groups of self- 
interest with ,the social and political status quo lightens ideolvgy’s 
burden considerably; the most articulate and influential groups have 
little desire for change. However, a “ liberal ” society is character- 
ised by competition f a r  dominance amongst two or more groups, 
by “ group pluralism.” Historically this state of affairs is usually 
the result of the self-assertion of a substant,ial and articulate middle 
l 7  Op. cit., p. 266. 
18 Berman, “The  Origins of Western Legal Science” (1977) 90 Harv. L. Rev. 
894, concludes, at p. 942, that “ the new Western legal science was much more 
than an intellectual achievement. . . , Its criteria were moral as well as intellectual. 
The ‘ form ’ expressed ‘ substantive ’ values and policies.” See also Kennedy, “ Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication ” (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685. 
19 Unger identifies ‘‘ tribal,” ‘‘ aristocratic,” “ traditionalistic ” and “ revolutionary 
socialist” societies as well as “ liberal ” societies; op. cit. pp. 137-153 and 223-234. 
Clearly different groupings may be equally valid; see e.g. Miller, Social Justice (1976), 
pp. 253-257. Goody has noted the dichotomous tendency of these taxonomies. He 
emphasises the significance of the development of literacy; see The Domestication of 
rhe Savage Mind (1977). 
2 0  Unger op. cit. p. 153, argues that it is never entirely absent; cf. Goody, o p .  cit. 
pp. 41-51. See also Llewellyn, “ Legal Tradition and Social Science Method,” in 
Jurisprudence (1962), p. 77, at p. 96, “ Concepts do not wholly condition observation 
--else we could never add to what we know.” 
21 Any explanation of power must, to be accepted, At the facts to some extent. 
Williams, op.  cit. p. 55, distinguishes three senses of the term “ ideology.” “ (1) A 
system of beliefs characteristic of a particular class or group; (2) a system of illusory 
belief-false ideas or false consciousness-which can be contrasted with true or 
scientiflc knowledge; (3) the general process of the production of meanings and 
ideas.” It is perhaps unwise to think of these as entirely separable. Similarly Gouldner 
argues that “Our own private interests . . . cannot be pursued successfully as our 
interests, but must be redefined as impersonal interests of general concern.” op. cit. 
(1976), p. 219. Cf. Minogue, “Natural Rights, Ideology and the Game of Life,” 
in Kamenka and Tay (eds.), Human Rights (1978), pp. 13-35. 
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class. Neither an emerging middle class, nor the traditional ruling 
class which it challenges, is prepared to concede the other’s dom- 
ination. Thus the achievement of equilibrium demands the genera- 
tion of the most sophisticated ideologies. 
The vary identification of pluralism might seem strongly catalytic 
or demystifying when contrasted with older “ organic ” views. Not 
so; in fact pluralists also perceive society in basic equilibrium, not 
an organic unity, but a nonetheless stable balance between groups 
actively competing for power. Pluralism thus obscures the way in 
which these groups taken togelther form a larger grouping which 
dominates the less articulate, and usually poorer, groups. This 
hegemony shapes and limits people’s views of themselves and their 
world. It is an active process, a to and fro between dominant and 
subordinate, in which the dominant culture produces and limits the 
forms of counter culture. The exchange of ideas about law is one 
of the contexts in which this process takes place, but the process 
saturates the whole process of living “ to  such a depth that the 
pressures and limits of what can ultimately be seen as a specific 
economic, pal i t id  and cultural system seem to most of us the 
pressures and limits of simple experience and common sense.” 22 As 
hegemonic domination is discovered where previously it had passed 
unramarked, so the taken-for-granted is transformed into 
ideological mystification. 
In the reexamination of ideas about social science, objectivity 
and impartiality have been unmasked, sometimes in a way that 
lends support to “ manipulative ” or “ conspiracy ” theories of class 
domination. Thus opposition to the Vietnam war led to the dis- 
covery of patently “ political ” considerations determining research 
appointments and the allocation of research However we 
should not ifail to notice that social science claims a scientific legi- 
timacy that can mislead in subtler ways. As a science it is concerned 
with “ facts ” and “ facts ” have to be measurable. The “ hard ” 
data thus tend to obscure the “ soft ” data.24 Gouldner goes further 
in discussing the ostensibly “ technical ” concerns of “ method- 
ology.” He asserts that “ it is commonly infused wilth ideologically 
resonant assumptions about what the social world is, who the soci- 
ologist is, and what the nature of the relation between them is.” 25 
22 Williams, op.  cit. p. 110 and see pp. 108-114. Milton Friedman, in Capitalism 
and Freedom (1971), p. 26, makes the same point with specific reference to the 
notion of property, which “has become so much a part of us that we take it for 
granted, and fail to recognise the extent to which just what constitutes property 
and what rights the ownership of property confers are complex social creations rather 
than self-evident propositions.” 
28 See Chomsky, op. cit. pp. 53 and 57-60 and American Power and the New 
Mandarins (1969). 
24 See Tribe, “ Technology Assessment and the Fourth qxontinuity: The Limits 
of Instrumental Rationality ” (1973) 46 S.Cal.L.Rev. 617, Trial by Mathematics: 
Precision and Ritual in the Legal Process ” (1971) 84 Harv.L.Rev. 1329, 1361-1365 
and 1389-1390 and Boyer, “ Alternatives to Administrativf, Trial-type Hearings for 
Resolving Complex Scientific, Economic and Social Issues (1972) 71 Mich.L.Rev. 
111, 150-164. 25 Op. cit. (1971), pp. 50-51, and, more generally, pp. 27-60. 
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Science has provided the model for some political theories. It has 
lent them legitimacy but has not ensured impartiality. Thus evolu- 
tionary natural science aided evolutionary political science, social 
Darwinism. Its individualistic tendencies are clearly illustrated in 
the popularised philosophy of Samuel Smiles. “What some men 
are, all without difficulty might be. Employ the same means and the 
same results will follow.” 26 
Equality of opportunity is a convenient tool in the explanation 
of material inequality. The democratic ideal employs it in an 
especially significant way, and has ‘become a cherished device for 
the resolution of the conflict (between individual and community 
interests. By this means the individual may be supposed to be satis- 
fied, even when his immediate interests have suffered, simply 
because he has had the chance to participate, usually very indirectly, 
in the decision making process. In combination with evolutionary 
gradualism the effect is powerfully homeostatic. 
The democratic ideal is probably essential to the maintenance of 
a liberal society, but it was not essential to its genesis. Of greater 
significance, because it is historically exclusive to liberal societies, 
is the notion of an autonomous, general, public and positive legal 
order, the ideal of the! “ rule of law.” 27 Here too the tension be- 
tween “ process ’’ and “ outcome,” between formal and substantive 
justice, is of fundamental importance.28 The essentially formal 
thrust of the Western ideal is well illlustrated by the pledge taken 
by the graduate of the University of Chicago Law School by which 
he undertakes 
“ t o  weigh [his] conflicting loyalties and guide [his] work 
with an eye to the good less of [himself] than of justice and 
of the people; and to be at all times, even tat personal sacrifice, 
a champion of fairness and due proas, in court or out, and 
for all, whether the powwful or envied or [his] neighbours or 
the helpless or the hated or the oppressed.” *9 
Its tendency to obscure substantive inequality is apparent when it 
is contrasted with this statement froan the thud world. 
“The rule of law is a dynamic concept . . . which should be 
employed not only to safeguard and advance the civil and 
political rights of the individual In a free society, but also to 
establish social, economic, educational and cultural conditions 
26 Quoted in Miller, op. cit. at p. 291. Miller discusses the philosophy of Herbert 
Spencer at pp. 180-208. 
21 See Unger, op. cit. pp. 66-86. Nevertheless most influential movements were 
democratic in the sense of being ‘‘ against governments and social orders whose aim 
is to prolong gross forms of inequality ”; Gallie, ‘‘ Essentially Contested Concepts ” 
(1955-56) 56 Proceedings of Aristotelian Society 167, 184. 
28 See Summers, “ Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for Process 
Values ” (1974) 60 Cornell L. Rev. 1, Trubeck, ‘‘ Complexity and Contradiction ift 
the Legal Order: Balbus and the Challenge of Critical Social Thought about Law 
(1977) 11  Lmu and Socie?y Review 529 and Lawrence Friedman, “ On Legalistic 
Reasoning-A Footnote to Weber ” [1966] Wis.L.Rev. 148. 
99 The full text is re-printed in Llewellyn, op. cit., note 20 supra, at p. 395. 
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under which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be 
realised.” 8o 
Formal equality before the law entails no participatory element. 
The subordinate need not be involved at all in the making d 
decisions. Their substantive claims can be completely excluded 
from consideration. The scope of the rule of law ideal‘s impurtial 
operation is thus profoundly limited. It is confined to issues about 
which disputants do not disagree   fundament ally.^^ Scarcity may 
generate conflicts of interest but these are less fundamental than 
conflicts of values. As (between disputants who share a particular 
ethos, the merely formal concerns of due process suffice to pro- 
duce a sense of resolution and satisfaction at the outcome. In 
terms of fundamental values the loser does not disagree with his 
opponent and he does not feel aggrieved that these values have 
not been 
By contrast a disputant may reject the ethos of his opponent. 
Such conacts (which are occurring more frequently and are thus 
contributing to our sense of crisis) are of values. The rule of law 
and formal impartiality are inadeqwite for the resolution of these 
conflicts. As Professor Milton Friedman has put it, “ Fundamental 
differences in basic values . . . ultimately . . . can only be decided, 
though not resolved, by conflict” 33 The rule of law ideal loses its 
effioacy when too many demand that the rules be changed. 
IV. EATING CONCEPTS IS WRONG 
The ‘ I  rule of law ” is thus a myth s4 that could only flourish in the 
absence of challenge. Once seriously challenged it becomes the 
rallying call for the dominant groups. Challenge has, for a time, 
been deflected by the power of the myth, but western man has 
become results oriented and less willing to accapt justifiuations that 
are directed essentially at “ process ” rathar than “ outcome.” As a 
utilitarian he evaluates everything by its effects; as a consumer he 
asks “ what has been produced? ” Qand not “ how has it been pro- 
30 The Rule of Law in u Free Society: A Report on the Znternationul Congress 
of Jurists (International Commission of Jurists, 1960); see Marsh, “The Rule of 
Law as a Supra-National Concept ” in Guest (ed.), Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 
(1961), p. 223 at p. 261, note 2. 
31 See Unger, op. cit., pp. 176-181. Sarat, in ‘‘ Studying American Legal Culture: 
An Assessment of Survey Evidence” (1977) 11 Lmu and Society Review 427, 
argues that equality is widely regarded as fundamental to justice ,a;”d the legitimacy 
Oi the legal system, but this is a demand not to be “less equal than others, not 
far the “ less equal ” to be equal. 
82  See Aubert, op. cir. pp. 27-30 and Barton, “Behind the Legal Explosion ” 
(1975) 27 Stan.L.Rev. 567. Barton notes, at p. 575, that formalism is one kind of 
response to dissensus that is tempting for the judge. 
55 Milton Friedman, op. cir. p. 24. Thus what appears to be “lag” from one 
standpoint is a threat to important values from another standpoint; see Lawrence. 
Friedman and Ladinsky, ’‘ M i l  Change and the Law of Industrial Accidents ’’ 
(1967) 67 Colum.L.Rev. 50, 72-77. 
~4 “ Myth ” does not equal ‘‘ lie ”; see note 21 supru and Trubek, op.  clr. at p. 
553 and p. 557. See generally Hunt, “ Problems of Legitimacy in the Contemporary 
Legal Order ” (1971) 24 0kla.L.Rev. 224. 
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duced? ”); in a world built on profit he asks “what is in it for 
him?” In a sense we are all Marxists now and as such we may be 
too apt to throw out the baby with the b a t h ~ a t e r . ~ ~  
This results orientation is a threat to any ideology and yet the 
societal need for legitimate authority, and hence for some ideology, 
to harmonise where there is discord is as great as ever before. 
Scarcity and the division of labour will continue to produce in- 
equality and our ideological imagination seems all too limited. 
Liberal society is in crisis partly because its ideology (of which the 
“ rule of law ” is a prominent part) is being exposed as ideology. 
The emergent middle class had demanded an Ideology that would 
emphasise individual (freedom; the rule of law ideal, the demo- 
cratic ideal, the theory of individual human rights, were thus b m  
of 8 spirit of criticism and a desire for change. Now these ideologies 
have turned both parricidal and cannibal; ithe principles that exposed 
the self-interest of the (aristocrat have exposed th(e self-interest of 
the merchant, the scientist, the lawyer and the intellectual and have 
nearly destroyed themselves in the process. 
The aannitbalistic tendency is inherent but not altogether spon- 
taneous. Ilt is in part the inevitable result of a wider propagation 
of liberal values through educational systems, but with a more 
imaginative view of their self-interest by the now dominant groups 
the process might at least have been slower.s6 Racial inequali8ty, 
the conflicts in Ireland and Vietnam, the Watergate, Poulson and 
Lockheed affairs, have each provided avoidable stimulation. 
How then can governments cope? Are there any ideals worth 
espousing or is an attempt to play off one group against another 
the only course? The new self-assertiveness of subordinate groups, 
in combination with a strong results orientation, renders the “ divide 
and rule ” tactic hazardous. Each group is a sometime loser. Hence 
each will have cause to expose the machiavellian character of 
governmen,t. Losers can be undiscriminating; they may attack both 
“ process ” and “ outcome.” The way forward may lie not in the 
invention of new ideologioal concepts but in the critical reexamha- 
tion of existing concepts. Somewhat after the manner of the Frank- 
furt school, government, aided by lawyers and a host of others, 
might measure reality by the claims implicit in “ democracy ” and 
the “rule of law.” If reality ware to prove the claims false that 
very demonstration might provoke change. If government were to 
35 See Goldthorpe, Lockwood er ul., The Afluent Worker Srudies-(l968 and 1969) 
and Gouldner op.  cir. (1976), pp. 238-249. In their attack on “ liberal lawyers,” 
Bankowski and Mungham, Images of Law (1976), pp. 1-6, move close to the position 
that something must be wrong simply because someone is suited. Chomsky’s comment, 
op.  cir. p. 63, is apposite; “ those who oppose a programme of social action merely 
on the grounds that it might be ‘ coopted ’ doom themselves to paralysis: they are 
oppcsed to everything imaginable.” 
See Hare, op. clt. Bertrand Russell, Sceptical Essays (1928), pp. 52-53, defines 
“rationality in practice’’ as “the habit of remembering all our relevant desires, 
and not only the one which happens at the moment to be strongest.” 
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help to initiate the critical process it could implement the changes 
in a manner that would enhance its m legitimacy.”‘ 
What view of “ democracy ” might be taken by this government 
that has suddenly become more critical than its critics? The demo- 
cratic ideal can have substantive effects. Who decides affects what 
is decided. However, whilst “ democracy ” is perhiaps less bankrupt 
than the “ rule of law,” it does have a strong mujoritarian aspect 3 8  
which is not well suited to dealing with conflicts in which the pro- 
tagonists include substantial, self-assertive minorities. It devalues 
democracy for these minorities to be dismissed as “ undemocratic ” 
simply because they are minorities. 
Nevertheless the purticipatory aspect 39 of the democratic ideal 
could be emphasised. Governments can hardly be expected to adopt 
anarchist programmes, but less secretive and less manipulative 
government is not unimagi~able.’~ Were decision makers to make 
clear the nature of rival claims and the difficulty or impossibility of 
reconciling thean, there would of course still be complaints that the 
wrong outcome had been chosen, but losers might justzably feel 
that they had been taken seriously and be consoled by the notion 
that we cannot all have prizes. To avoid mere mystification 41 there 
must be more than a right to a hearing; there must be a duty to 
listen to and weigh u€Z the substantive claims. 
This amounts to a revolutionary ~trategy.’~ Dominant groups 
may not have sacrificed much control when the links between pro- 
perty and franchise were severed, but the control implicit in the 
essentially bourgeois conceptions of “ monetised ” and “ intellec- 
tual ” property (with their close relatives, “ confidentiality ” and 
“ privilege ”) would be directly threatened by “ open ” government. 
Tokenism is more likely than a voluntary surrender of privilege. 
David Trubeck sounds a warning n d e  for government when he 
contends that “ a State cannot maintain legitimacy for long periods 
of time if the reality of its behaviour is in marked contradiction 
with the claims it makes Ifor legitimacy.” He argues that “ the need 
to maintain legitimacy will impel the State to make changes when 
the gap between ideal and reality becomes apparent.” +s Since gov- 
87 See Trubeck, op. cit., p. 559 and cf. Balbus, “ Commodity Form and Legal 
Form: An Essay on the ‘ Relative Autonomy ’ of Law ’’ (1977) 11 Low and Society 
Review 571, 581-582 and note 9. 
Gallie, op. cir. pp. 184-185, lists three examples of contesting conceptions of 
democracy. The 51st two, the power of the people to remove a government and 
equal rights to take office, etc., are majoritarian. 
89 Gallie’s third example, op. cit. p. 185, is ‘‘ the continuous active participation 
of citizens in political l i e  at all levels.’’ 
40 Ronald Dworkin has argued (New Society, June 24, 1976, pp. 679-680) that 
the traditional view that assumes that Cabinet secrecy is justifiable should be 
rejected. “ I t  says that confidentiality must be guaranteed so that reasons that 
are not justifications can be given to cabinet without fear that they will be given 
to the public as well. . . . Decisions become more decisive when they are taken by 
institutions that are more representative.” 
4 1  Or mere “ co-optation ”; see Chomsky, op. cit. p. 63. 
42 It is not seriously advocated by the three traditional British political parties; 
48 Trubeck, op. cit. p. 558. see Halsey, op. cir. at note 5 supra. 
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ernments are amongst those most convinced of, and most misled 
by, dominant ideologies, such changes axe likely to be too late and 
too small. 
V. THE HIGH PRIESTS 
If such is the gloomy outlook for government, what of the judges, 
the high priests of the rule d law? They seem especially vulnerable 
to the process of demystifkation and rejection. The rule of law 
ideal p tu l a t e s  “ a  realm somewhere within the mystical haze 
beyond the courts, where d l  our dreams of justice in an unjust 
world m e  true.” 44 Since men cannot a m  about justice, is it not all 
too easy to strip the priests of their regalia and to expose them 
as the agents of class dominance? 
Acceptance of judicial legitimacy has not been carefully in- 
vestigated in this country.45 Some United States studies suggest that 
ignorance of what courts do, and of how they operate, is wide 
spread. They also note fairly high levels of respect for courts as 
 institution^.^^ There is little reason to imagine that the United 
Kingdom situation differs greatly. Most attacks on the authority 
of the judiciary have been directed, not a t  the judiciary as an insti- 
tution, but at specific (usually lower ranking) judges in connection 
with their treatment of a specific case or Two questions 
arise. First, how has judicial legitimacy survived thus far? Secondly, 
what is the outlook? Is a storm about to break? 
Judges are probsbly seen primarily as adjudicators, and as such 
contrasted (with legislators. Since legislation is an obviously dis- 
crdionary activity, adjudication may be generally perceived as 
mechanistic. There is some evidence to suggest that the rather dif- 
fuse support for  the courts as institutions is linked with a wide 
spread acceptance of the myth of mechanical jurisprudence, the 
rule of laws and not men.48 Casey argues that this myth is so deeply 
emMded that it is not easily Familiarity, however, 
does seem to breed contempt. Direct contact with the courts seems 
to bring disillusion. Close contact with individual practitioners and 
judges challenges the mechanistic myth.so Far more work is needed 
44 Arnold, “ Symbols of Government ” in Aubert (ed.), The Sociology of Law 
(1969), p. 47. On‘$e religious,,analogy, see Balbus, op.  cit. p. 579. Cf. Jerome 
Frank’s notion of legal magic 
45 Evidence of the extent to which it has been taken for granted; cf. note 21 
supra. 46 The evidence is reviewed by Sarat, op. cit. at pp. 438441. 
47 Sentencing policy, or lack of it, is frequently a target, possibly because it raises 
rather ohvious questions of equality; cf. note 31 supra. See also the experiences of 
Judge Argyle in the Oz Trial of 1971, of Mdford SvevensOn J., who took the 
unusual step of calling a press conference to defend himself after widely publicised 
criticism of some of his decisions by Lord Wid- C.J. (see The Times, February 21, 
1976), and of DOnald~~n 1. as judge of the ill-fated National Industrial Relations 
Court. Judge McKinnon Q.C., has asked to be relieved of cases raising racial issues 
following the outcry with which his remarks in the Read case were met; see The 
Times, January 7, 1978 and January 14, 1978. 
+g See Sarat op. cit. pp. 4394. The studies are predominantly of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
49 “ The Supreme Court and Myth ” (1974) 8 Law and Society Review 385. 
50 See Sarat, op. cit., p. 439; but the studies here are of inferior courts. 
in Courts on Trial (19491, pp. 37-79. 
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before these connections can be fully understood. Nevertheless we 
might hypothesise that, at preeent, judicial legitimacy is in substan- 
tial part dependent on I popular ignorance which permits the 
survival of a mechanistic View of the judicial process as impartial, 
consistent and autonomous. 
Can this ideology survive an onslaught of cases brought not by 
members of dominant groups against members of subordinate 
groups, nor by members of dominant groups against their fellow 
members, but by the representatives of subordinate groups? 51 The 
current paradigm of the judicial process. is the adjudication of (pre- 
existing) rights, not a “give a little, get a little” process d media- 
tion or conciliation. It is la “ winner takes all ” process. Thcse who 
were accustomed to losing (or were so sure ithat they would lose 
that a claim was not worth making) are becoming less docile. The 
main deterrent to litigation (viz. the need to avoid a zero sum 
game because one has to continue some -operative relationship 
with one’s opponent 5 2 )  does not affect these “ loser-groups.” The 
opponents in these cases will not share a ccnnmon ethos. Their 
contests will be of values and not merely of interests. The judicial 
decision will be seen, whoever wins, as favouring the values of the 
winner. Hence judicial discretion will be more obvious and more 
controversial. The claim to even-handedness will be exposed as false. 
Parliament can be expected to bear some part of this burden. 
Judges may say ,that Parliament made the law, or that it is for Par- 
liament to change it, but “loser-groups” will cane  closer to the 
judicial process and have reason .to look more closely at buck- 
passing arguments. They may regard a t e s t a e  strategy as an 
important step in securing rule change.5s If they lose a case, that 
judicial decision becomes the ifocus for an attack on the rule. If 
~~ 
51 Sea Barton, op. cit. Rosenberg, in “Devising Procedures that are Civil to 
Promote Justice than is Civilii” (1971) 69 Mich.L.Rev 797, comments, at p. 812, 
“ if irate losers cannot vent their disappointment in their votes for legislators they 
will turn upon the judges and courts whenever they get the chance . . . wrongly or 
rightly, the voters regard the courts with less confidence if they think that the 
courts are making political decisions they ought not to be making.” For a review 
of the expansion of l o y  standi that has accompanied the United States “legal 
explosion,” see Orren, Standing to Sue: Interest Group Cb$lict in the Federal 
Courts *’ (1976) 70 Am.Pol.Sci.Rev. 723. On the queation of who, ty ically, sues 
who? ” see Galanter, “ Why the ‘ Haves ’ Come Out Ahead Speculaions on the 
Limits of Legal Change ” (1974) 9 Low und Suciery Review 95, Galanter, “ After- 
word Explaining Litigation” (1975) 9 Lao and Society Review 347, Consumer 
Council, Justice Our of Reach:A Case for  Small Claims Courts (1970), Macauley. 
“ Non-Contractual Relations in Busin?: A Preliminary Study ” (1963) 28 American 
Sociological Review 55, Macauley, Elegant Models, Empirical Pictures and the 
Complexities of Contract” (1977) 11 Low and Society Review 507 and Beale and 
Dugdale, “Contracts between Businessmen: Planning and the Use of Contractual 
Remedies ” (1975) 2 British Journal of Law and Society 45. 
52 See Macauley, op. cit. (1977). Collective organisation can solve the problems of 
financing litigation and ignorance of “rights.” Problems of doubt as to the rules 
and locus standi remain. See Orren, op. cit., and Gouriet v. U.P.O.W. [1977] 3 
All E.R. 70. 
58 See Smith. “ Discretion or Legislation ” (1974) 124 New L.J.. 219. Partinnton. 
“ Some Thoughts on ‘ Test-Case Strategy ’ ” (1974) -124 New L.Z. 236 and Gala&: 
op. cit. (1974) pp. 135-139. 
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they win, the judicial decision becomes the focus for a counter- 
attack by the newly displaced dominant group. In either event the 
judicial decision is publicly attacked because of its substantive out- 
come. In a world that is in conflict about substantive values, no 
decision can enhance judicial legitimacy by virtue of its outcome 
alone. Despite an almost universal results orientation, we are 
driven back to pr0ces6.~~ 
To talk of “ legitimacy through process ” is to speculate, but the 
issues are nonetheless important. Barry Boyer has asked, “ Is the 
battle atmosphere of trial proceedings truly cathartic, in the sense 
of relieving tensions and aggressions that would otherwise find 
more destructive outlets, or does it instil an aggressive approach 
to problems that is incompatible with the need to compromise and 
co-operate in the vast majority of interpersonal contacts? ” 5 5  The 
analysis above, based on the theoretical speculation of Vilhdm 
Aubert and a little empirical work by Stewart Macauley, suggests 
that the latter is more likely in the case initiated by the “loser- 
group.” The former is perhaps the case in “mere” conflicts of 
i n t e r e ~ t . ~ ~  However, “ there is no more an enduring {function of a 
court than there is an enduring function of a king.” 5 7  New prob- 
lems might demand new processes. We can at  least review the range 
of possibilities. 
Judges might throw caution to the wind and become conwiously 
and overtly political. Amongst the lower ranks of the French and 
Italian career judiciaries, some judges have committed themselves 
to the values of campaigning loser-gr~ups.~~ The United States 
Supreme Court has been accused of similarly “ poli’tical ” activity.5* 
54 Rwnberg, up. cit. at p. 797, believes ‘‘ that the road to court-made justice 
is paved with good procedures.” Summers, op. cit. at p. 39, comments, “ Consider 
how often laymen seem ready to dismiss procedural rules as ‘ mere technicalities ’ 
even though these are the very rules which secure most process values.” Recruitment 
and train,iflg are important variables which may be included in this notion of 
“ process. 
55 Op. cit. p. 149, note 139. See also Devlin,,,“ Judges and Law-Makers ” (1976) 
39 M.L.R. 1, 3 4 ,  and Llewellyn’s comment, in Oi,Reading and Using the Newer 
Jurisprudence ” (1940) 40 Columb.L.Rev. 981, 610, An impressive ceremonial has 
a value in making people feeJ that something is being done; and there is m e  value 
in an institution which makes men content with their fate whatever that fate may 
be.” ‘‘ Ostentatious impartiality ’’ plays a role in this process; see Paterson, “ Judges: 
A Political Elite?” (1974) 1 British Journal of  Low and Society 118 at pp. 126-127 
and Gfith, The PoNtlcs of  the Judiciary (1977). 
56 Aubert, op. cir. (1963), p. 31, notes the tendency of court procedures to push 
the parties to a dispute further apart, but Macauley, y~ cir. (1977), pp. 515-517, 
cites examples of litigation promoting compromise. The loser pays all ” rule as to 
cmts, the payment into court system and formal requirements far conciliation in 
employment, matrimonial and discrimination disputes indicate the complexity of 
this question. 
57 Lawrence Friedman, “ Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change ” (1967) 
19 Stam.L.Rev. 786,798. 
67 and Treves (1974) 1 British Journal of Lmu and Society 200, 203. 
58 See Harlow, ‘‘ ‘ Red ’ Judges, White Collars and Bail ” (1976) 6 Kingston L.Rev. 
59 See for example the “ Declaration on Integration ” of March 12, 1956, which 
is the considered response of 96 Southern Congressmen to Brown v. Board of 
Educarion of  Topeka, 347 U.S. 48:‘(1954). The Declaration points to parents’ rights 
and describes the decision as an unwarranted exercise of power by the Court,” 
Nov. 19781 A “ KNOT ” IN THE SOCIAL BOND 673 
Dominant group backlash is the obvious risk and process can pro- 
vide no protection. Alternatively judges might indulge more in the 
kind of politics alleged to inhabit smokefilled rooms. They might 
mediate or conciliate, seeking to promote compromise. The more 
doctrinaire loser-groups will be impatient with this, and the incre- 
mental gains of the less fanatical will nevertheless aggravate 
opponents. 
A “ scientific ” or “ rational ” approach is a further, and “ apoli- 
tical,” possibility. Its viability is suspect because value conflicts are 
not susceptible of resolution by these techniquesB0 Instead, such 
problems tend to be polycentric, the various kinds of ‘‘ hard ” data 
are not easily commensurable and the “ soft ” data are even mare 
problematic.B1 Scientific reasoning is not inappropriate to the deter- 
mination of policy, but in these cases reasoning is employed, not 
merely determinatlively, but persuasively (or contentiously) and as 
justification.62 The manner in which a specific dispute raises a 
general issue is also a strong pressure to an incremental “ try a little 
and see ” approach that does not involve the comprehensive seek- 
ing and reviewing of data that a scientific amroach would seem to 
demand.8s This approach, whilst making a claim to “ legitimacy 
through process,’7 is thus unlikely to be proof against she attack of 
those who will use their own data and calculations to reach oppo- 
site conclusions. They will explain the discrepancy not in scientific 
but in political terms. 
These three approaches are not “ legal ” in the sense of depend- 
ing on the wcognition of legal lvles and principles as a special 
class of exclusionary reasons constituted under an authoritative 
practice or (institutional system.E4 The ‘‘ political ” and “ scientific ” 
the exercise of “ naked judicial power ” and the substitution of “ personal political 
and social ideas for the established law of the land.” It commends the motives 
of those States which have declared ‘‘ the intention to resist forced integration by 
any lawful means.” See Le?, “The Supreme Court and its Critics’’ (1961) 45 
Minn.L.Rev. 305, Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Co?!titutional Law ” 
(1959) 73 Harv.L.Rev. 1. D$ences of the Court include Black, The Lawfulness 
of the Segregation Decisions (1960) 69 Yale L.3. 421. See also Pollack, ‘‘ Securing 
Liberty through Litigation” (1973) 36 M.L.R. 113 and Dworkin, TRS, pp. 130-149. 
Advocates include Siedman, ‘‘ The Judicial Process Reconsidered in the Light 
of Role-%wry’’ (1969) 32 M.L.R. 516. For an interesting hybrid approach, see 
Bolding, Reliance an Authorities or Open Debate? Two Models of Legal ,$rgu- 
mentation” (1969) XI11 Scandinavian Studies in Law 61. Rawls argues, in Two 
Concepts of Rules ” (1955) 64 Philosophical Review 3, 30, that “ Under the influence 
of the summary conception [of rules] . . . one fails to see that a general discretion 
to decide on particular grounds is incompatible with the concept of a pructice” 
(emphasis added).,, 
61 See Fuller, Collective Bargaining and the Arbitrator ” [1963] Wis.L.Rev. 3. 
Fuller argues that mediation and conciliation roles and the adjudicatory role are 
difiicult to combine (p. 26). On “po!ycentric,” see pp. 30-35, Jowell, “The Legal 
Control of Administrative Discretion 119731 P.L. 178, 213-215 and Boyer, op. cit. 
pp. 150-164. 
62 See Tribe, op. cir. (19731, p. 630 and Perelman, ‘‘ What is Legal Logic? ’’ 
(1968) 3 Israel Low Review I, 3. 
.89 See Shapiro, “ Stability and Change in Judicial Decision-Makine: Incre- 
mentalism or Srare Decids? ” (1965) 2 Lmu in Transition QuarrerZy 134. 
6 4  Ste Rawls, op. cir. (19.59, Raz, Practical Rearon and Norms (1975) and 
Maccormick, “Law as Institutional Fact” (1974) 90 L.Q.R. 102. 
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approaches might purport to generate rules, but only on the 
balance of broad utili’tarian considerations, and not because of the 
normative ‘force of peculiady authoritative rules which claim to be 
reasons for disregarding all other reasons. Ironically, any rules 
generated by these alternative approaches will, in order to operate 
normatively, have to make a claim to the status of exclusionary 
reason. Without this status there is no reason not to decide each 
subsequent case de novo. Without such reasons there can be no 
very specific rules in the normative sense. The “ scientific ” and 
“ political ” approaches would seem to make the claim to generate 
specific rules and to be weakened therein by their own independence 
from rules. 
Rules, in the form with which lawyers are currently familiar, are 
unlikely to disappear. Even systems of self-regulation are likely to 
be set up by, or allowed to continue at, the will of some institu- 
timalised government. Such practices, like mediation and con- 
ciliation, will be “ rule-supported ’’ if not “ ruleenforcing.” The 
possibility of the “enforcement” of the “supporting” rules in 
jurisdictional disputes and the like will not be eliminated. More 
importantly, the main pressure on the present system comes, not 
from anarchists, but from loser-groups whose complaint is that 
they do not have enough of the action. These groups do not want 
to destroy (but to redivide or gain for themselves the power of the 
State which will remain “ the principal prize in the perpetual con- 
flict that is society.” 65 They are not against rules; 011 the contrary, 
they want rules which favour them. 
VI. HERBERT’S EXAMPLE 
Loser-groups will thus make two kinds of claim with which a 
system that is to some extent an affair of rules (and principles) 
must cope. First, they will demand d.irectly that the rules be 
changed. Should judges become widely recognised as legislators 
they, and not only Parliament, will be asked to change the rules. 
Secondly, loser-groups will contmd that the rules have been con- 
sistently misinterpreted. They will use well-established formalistic 
techniques to argue for revolutionary results. They will interpret 
statutes and judgments as they have never been interpreted before.66 
In both kinds of case judges will need the ability to explain their 
role to themselves, to those who contest before them and to those 
who observe them. In this sense they require an ideology which 
explains the relationship between adjudication and legislation, be- 
tween adjudicator and legislator. Their problem is not remote from 
that of the contem’porary judge in the “ hard case.” 
Professor Dworkin has recently offered us a model of errors in 
65 Chambliss and Seidman, Law, Order and Power (19711, p. 4. 
66 Consider, for example, London Borough of Southwark v. WiZZiarns [1971] 2 All 
E.R. 175 and Nothman v. Barnet London Borough Council [1977] I.R.L.R. 489. 
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the form of Herbert J.6‘ Herbert is an honest fellow who sees his 
function in hard cases as filling in the gaps. When the ruleguidance 
rum out, Her- beli0ves that he is on his own. He is thus tom 
between a democratic respect f a r  majority opinion and his per- 
son& opinion on the moral question involved. This role of deputy 
legislator8* is fraughlt with problems. On many issues the state of 
majority opinion may be indeterminable or contentious. Further- 
more, loser-groups will have little respect for a majority opinion 
that does not coincide with their own and will have developed 
plausible arguments based on human righ’ts. A hard case is thus a 
straightforward clash d m i o n  (between Herbert J. and the loser- 
groups. 
HerM’s method and its hazard is exemplil3ed in the recent case 
of D. v. N.S.P.C.C.6* in part af the judgment of Scarman L.J. (as 
he then was). Having formalistically rejeoted the claim by the 
N.S.P.C.C. that it should not, on the ground of “ public interest,” 
be compelled to disolose informants’ names,To he was faced with 
a narrower argument which exploited the regard for consistency 
which is deep in lthe common lawyer. Counsel for the N.S.P.C.C. 
argued that,  because the society is authorised to bring care pro- 
ceedings pumuant to section 1 of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1969, it stands for these purposes in the same position as the 
police. The police are able to make an effective offer of confiden- 
tiality to potential informants because they cannot be compelled to 
reveal an informant’s naaneT1 The N.S.P.C.C. should be able to do 
likewise. Scarman L.J. said, in giving his fourth reason for rejecting 
this argument, 
“ Nevertheless it has  to be accepted that some may be deterred 
from giving information to the N.S.P.C.C., if Crown privilege 
cannot [be claimed. ”’his is a loss which could be damaging to 
the public interest. But the damage has to be considered in a 
wider context evem than the welfare of children. What sort of 
society is the law to reflect? If it be an open society, then 
87 T f i ,  pp. 125 ef seq. TRS, p. 82. 
69 [1976] 3 W.L.R. 124; [1976] 2 All E.R. 993; refs. infra to W.L.R.; see also 
(19771 1 All E.R. 589 (H.L.). 
70 for one reason only . . . I can flnd in the cuses no departure from the 
historic link between the interest of the public service of the State and Crown 
privilege.” (p. 137 D, emphasis added). The N.S.P.C.C., a voluntary, independent 
body, is nevertheless incorporated by Royal Charter and ‘‘ authorised,” along with 
the police and local authorities, under,: 1 (1) of the Children and Young Persons 
Act 1969, to bring “care proceedings in respect of children. One of the Society’s 
inspectors had called on the plaintia, following up what was apparently a totally 
unfounded report that her 14-month-old child had been maltreated. The plaintiff 
suffered nervous shock and claimed damages in negligence from the Society. The 
N.S.P.C.C. thereupon applied for an order forbidding the disclosure of documents 
in their possession revealing, or capable of revealing, the name of its informant. 
Without this information the plaintiff’s case would be diillcult to establish. 
71 At least in civil proceedings; see Marks v. Beyfus (1890) 25 Q.B.D. 494, per 
Bowen L.J. at p. 500, and Lord Denning M.R. in D. v. N.S.P.C.C. at p. 133 D-F. 
For a justiffcation of the ,,%fferential treatment of uvil and criminal cases, see 
Palley [1968] P.L. 93, 95, The liberty of th0 subject i s  more important than the 
andour of communications, whereas the right to damages may not be so regarded.” 
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men must face the consequences of giving information to 
bodies such as the N.S.P.C.C. . . . If it be a society in which as 
a general rule, informers may invoke the public interest to 
protect their anonymity, the law may )be found to encourage 
a Star Chamber world wholly alien to the English tmdition.” 72 
Reasoning of this style does nothing to avoid a head-on clash of 
opinion between those who feel that thle N.S.P.C.C. should be in 
this sense privileged and those who do not. Opponents of Scarman 
L.J.’s view would point to the inaccuracy or naivety of the reference 
to “an  open society” and contend that this was a far more legi- 
timate case for secrecy than some already accepted in law. The 
important paint is the implication of the quoted passage that 
Scarman L.J. regarded himself as free to decide the case differently 
if he so wished. The apparent reasion ifor the decision is thus his 
personal preference.’ 
An attempt could be made to claim some “ scientific ’’ legitimacy 
for such value-judgments. A judge might use his legalistic skill to 
determine whether or not he has a choice and his skill as a social 
scientist to make the ch~ ice . ‘~  This proposition is open to the 
objections already discussed. “ Scientific ” legitimacy is not impreg- 
nable against a critical attack which is determined to find evidence 
of factional interest. Judges would have to secure some training in 
social science methods, but above all they would have to be ever- 
vigilant that they did not imagine those methods to be in any sense 
“ pure,” “ objective ’’ or “ valuefree.” They should present them 
simply as the best available tools of the social engineer. 
Nevertheless, as social engineers, they could insist on considering 
appropriate data. They could avoid making assertions of “social 
fact” without adequate supporting evidence. For example, the 
acceptance in D. v. N.S.P.C.C. of the Society’s evidence that its 
sources of information would dry up if it was compelled to disclose 
informants’ names was crucid to the decision in the Society’s fav- 
However, our small pilot investigation suggests that this claim 
may be hard to e~tablish.’~ The Brandeis brief shows that this kind 
72 p. 141 D-F. His other reasons are (i) “ that the police have a special position, 
because they perform an essential function of government ” (p. 139 E-F) (which is 
formalistic; in this class of case the N.S.P.C.C. is performing the same function 
whether or not they are properly called functions of government), (ii) that there is 
other protection for confidences which the court will remove only if the information 
i5 “relevant and necessary to enable justice to be done,” and (iii) that in any 
event the privilege could, if it were to exist, be set aside by the court. The possibility 
that the court can lay down some general principles as to when it would order 
disclosure (e.g. never in a civil case) weakens (ii) and (iii). 
78 His other reasons are not open to this objection, see note 72 supra. Reasons 
(ii) and (iii) are attempts at  the Herculean method, see section VII infra. Cf. Ex p. 
Church of Scientology of California, The Times, February 21, 1978. 
74 Cf.  Seidman, op.  cir. and Bolding, op. cit. 
75 The House of Lords was also concerned at the risk to legitimacy in comparison 
with their earlier decision concerning the Gaming Board in R. v. Lewes Justices, 
ex p .  Secretary of State for Home Department [1973] A.C. 388; see, per Lord 
Diplock, [19771 1 All E.R. 589, 595 d-e. 
76 Radford and Weaver, The Decision to Report: Low Visibility in the Courts 
(available from the authors). A questionnaire was administered by student inter- 
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of evidence can be accommodated within our present adversary 
Because of fundamental weaknesses, small gains are all that can 
be expected. But, if nothing else, judges might become circumspect 
in their use of “public interest rhetoric.” Mitnick has pointed out 
that “ central to the concept of ‘ interest ’ is the notion of ‘ prefer- 
ence’”78 In the kind of case we are considering it is fatuous to 
talk of “what the public prefers.” Such rhetoric can easily be ex- 
posed as an inept attempt to conceal factional interest. 
system.7 
VII. THE STRENGTH OF HERCULES 
To point the error of Herbert’s ways, Professor Dworkin offers us a 
“ superjudge,” Hercules.’” Like Herbert, Hercules acknowledges 
the effect of his pmsonal convictions on the outcome of hard cases, 
but he denies them any totally independent force. By recognising 
that rule guidance does not simply run out leaving a gap, that it is 
“ not incomplete, like a book whose last page is missing,” Hercules 
purports to avoid the dichotomy between personal opinion and 
democratic decision. 
The clearest advantage is gained in statutory interpretation, for 
it is there that the relationship with the legislature is most obvioas. 
Hercules does not simply say that a statute is ambiguous and then 
proceed to fill the gap as some kind of deputy legislature, but in- 
stead proceeds to search for the political theory that best justifies the 
particular statute. The interpretation he adopts is the one which best 
serves the end of that political theory, and not the one which best 
serves his personal preference. He may in fact regard the result as 
undesirable.81 Thus the opportunity for loser-groups to attack 
Hercules, without at the Same time attacking the legislature and 
themselves appearing undemocratic, is reduced. They may of course 
be able to argue that Hercules picked the wrong interpretation, that 
he “ misapplied ’’ his own technique. That ‘‘ misapplication ” will 
viewers to 115 addresses in the Faraday Ward of the London Borough of Southwark. 
The response rate was 695 per cent. Social Services departments proved to be the 
agency to which most of our sample would refer a case of suspected child abuse 
(575 per cent.). The N.S.P.C.C. (45 per cent.) and the police (40 per cent.) proved 
to be important agencies of secondary resort. There is thus little support for the 
main element in the reasoning of Scarman L.J. (see note 72 (i) supra). Our questions 
on the effects of confidentiality on potential informants did not provide any very 
clear results. When :;ked whether !Fy themselves would be deterred from making 
a report by fear of 725 per cent. replied negatively. Nevertheless 
as many as 69 per cent. thought that “ people in general ” would be deterred. As 
the question was hypothetical in both instances, one is left wondering whether 
interviewees’ desires to show themselves to be responsible and upright citizens may 
have led them to overestimate their own willingness to report without: guarantees of 
confidentiality, and whether their estimation of the likely conduct of others may 
not in fact be a more reliable indicator of their own likely conduct. 
7 7  Muller v. State of Oregon 208 U.S. 412 (1908). 
78 “ A Typology of Conceptions of the Public Interest ” (1976) 8 Administration 
and Society 5, 11. 
79 TRS, p. 105. 
80 TRS, p. 103, citing Gallie, op. cit. 
legal trouble 
81 TRS, pp. 107-110. 
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be thought of as some kind of “Freudian slip,” revealing a funda- 
mental bias; but the Hercdean method stretches the technical skills 
of the loser-groups in making out such arguments a little more than 
Herbert’s method does. 
Except in constitutional cases, there are no arguments as to 
whether a statute, properly processed by the legislature, is or is not 
law. The argument is solely over meaning. Common law hard cases 
are essentially different; “ the argument for a particular rule may be 
more important than the argument from that rule to the particular 
case.’ys2 When dealing with arguments for a rule the judge must 
decide the direction and strength of the “gravitational force” of 
previous daisions. ‘‘ Judges and lawyers do not think that the force 
of precedents is exhausted, as a statute would be, by the linguistic 
limits d some particular phrase.” 83 Instead the questions are of a 
different order. They can be represented schematically as ‘‘ Granted 
that the courts have compelled A to do act ‘ Z,’ should B be required 
to do act ‘ Z ’ ? ” In deciding such questions Hercules claims that he 
is guided by the principle of oonsistency. His personal judgment is 
inwitable, but it is not simply a mabter of personal preference. 
If all common law hard cases were as simple as that question, 
Hercules could not make out his claim. Either result could easily be 
reconciled with A’s case, and would beg the question of justification. 
However, the structure is invariably more complex. The question 
might more realistically be represented as, “ Granted that the courts 
have compelled A to do act ‘ Z,’ C to do act ‘ Z,’ D to act ‘ Y,’ E 
to do act ‘ X,’ etc., should B be required to do act ‘ Z ’? ” The con- 
sistency principle now narrows the range of alternative theories 
subtantidy. By “ searching for mciples rather than collating 
decisions,’’ 84 Hercules will again attempt ,to construct a political 
theory.s5 His choices will be constrained by the need to construct a 
theory which explains all the cases of A, C, D, etc., which are not in 
his view mistaken.86 Again he will claim that his decision does not 
simply reflect his own opinion. Unfortunately loser-groups may 
suspect that the principle he has chosen is the one he prefers. They 
will be encouraged by his classification of one previous decision as 
mistaken to suspect that his felt obligation to give weight to other 
decisions in formulating his principlb is the result, not of regard for 
consistency, but of personal preference. 
Hercules does not really exist and we are thus in some doubt as to 
whether his ‘‘ superhuman skill, learning, patience and acumen ” 
provide him merely with the ability to describe what his human 
brethren do in fact, or whether his method is offered as a prescrip- 
tion, an ideal to which his human <brethren should aspire.8T 
82 TRS, p. 112. 33 TRS, p. 113. 
84 Per Lard Kilbrandon, Nonvich Pharmacal Co. v. Commissioners of Customs 
and Excise [1973] 2 All E.R. 943,974 E. 85 TRS, pp. 115-118. 
88 TRS, pp. 118-123. 
87 TRS, p. 105; see Marshall, “ Postivism, Adjudication, and Democracy” in 
Hacker and Raz (eds.), op. cit. p. 132, 133. 
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Viewed as description, the primacy given to consistency suggests, 
somewhat misleadingly, that there is some “right answer” which 
can be mechanistically However, the judicial process 
is not mechanical in the way that a computer, once programmed, has 
the capacity to generate correct answers. It is closer to a computer 
that is inorementally and automatically re-programmed every time 
it is asked a question and every time it answers a question. b g d  
rules (and, indirectly, principles) are incrementally reconstituted in 
the very process of their application. Consistency emphaskes the 
causal at the expense of the colt~titutive.~~ 
Further, there are cases which the Herculean method seems totally 
inept to describe. For example, the intespretation of paragraph 10 
(b)  of Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 
1974 in Nofhman V. Barnet London Borough Council as eliminat- 
ing sex differences in the age limits for employment protection 
amounts to the substitution of preference for ClegaJ) principle. Re- 
liance on consistency with the spirit of the Sex Dkriminatiun Act 
1975 is fatuous. That Act was passed after the 1974 Act and con- 
stituted an opportunity for Parliament to do something to standard- 
ise the age limits for employment protection which it did not take. 
The explanations offered recently in this journal by Kerr J. of the 
innovatory decisions to allow judgment in currencies other than 
sterling and to grant injunctions restraining defendants from removing 
their assets out of the jurisdiction are essentially practical commer- 
cial e~planations.~’ Their contact with legal principle is at such a 
level of abstraction (fairness and equity) that consistency has little 
explanatory or justificatory force. We are reminded instead that 
legal principles are “the meeting point of rules and values.” s2 Such 
cases may well be examples of judges’ “best judgment about what 
[the parties’] rights are,” S3 but they are at the same time statements 
of their best judgment of what the parties’ rights ought to be. 
Dworkin seeks to legitimate the judicial contribution by confining 
it to questions of “plniaciple” (i.e. concerned with individual or 
group rights ’* ). He argues that judges characteristically do not, and 
ideally should not, deal in “ policy ” (i.e. the formulation of goals for 
the community as a whule S5 ). The instances already given deny this 
See *orkin, “No Right Answer ” in Hacker and Raz (eds.), op. cir. p. 58. 
Compare the attitudes to statutory interpretation in Firzleef Esrates Ltd. v. Cherry 
El9771 3 All E.R. 996 and TerTy v. Emf Sussex C.C. 119771 1 All E.R. 567, 571g. 
See also Priddle v. Dibble 11978) 1 All E.R. 1058, 1059g and W .  Devis & Sons Lrd. 
v. Arktns 11977) 3 All E.R. 40, 43g-f. 
89 See Tribe, op. cit. (1973). 
SO See note 66, supra 
91 *‘ Modern Trends in Commercial Law and Practice ” (1978) 41 M.L.R. 1, %15. 
See also Grey, “ In re Vandenelk The Jurisprudential Aspects ” (1975) 21 McGill 
L.J. 160. 
92 MacCormick, op. cit. p. 127. 
98 TRS, p. 104. 
94 TRS, p. 82. 
95 TRS, p. 84; cf. Marshall, op. cit. pp. 135-137 and the discussion of similar 
distinctions drawn by Rawls in Barry, The Liberal Theory of Justice (1973), 
pp. 134143. 
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as description. United States constitutional cases, being in essence 
contests between different ” conceptions ” of the various “ concepts ” 
employed in declaring the constitutional principles in the sacred 
text, might properly be described as concerned with “principles” 
and not “ policies.” However, in common law decision making there 
is no sacred text, and without one the principles/policies distinction 
seems unworkable. In hard cases, under loser-group pressure, one 
man’s “ principle ” will be another man’s “ policy.” 9 6  
The distinction between “ concepts ” and “ conceptions ” (and 
the parallel distinctions between the “ symbolic ” and “ enforcement ” 
levels and between “ law in the books ” and “ law in action ”) 
might be more fruitf~l.~’ It provides a means by which con- 
troversy can be accommodated and not simply confined to the 
gaps. Nevertheless, like the rule of law ideal, it has important 
misleading tendencies. It can provide the illusion d agreement at an 
abstract level and thereby mask real conflict at the specific or opera- 
tional The outcomes of hard cases focus attention on these 
conflicts and the ‘‘concept” may be brought into disrepute. A 
principle of formal consistency can then be of no further assistance, 
despite Herculean attempts to discover the “right” answer. More 
important will be an emphasis on consistency as an aid to substan- 
tive justice; not consistent reasoning from incidents of inequality but 
honest and serious attempts to understand both the new and the old 
claims. Judges will have to make imaginative leaps, to empathisle. 
The manner in which the judical p r w s s  is conducted might then 
encourage the parties to disputes to indulge in the same activity. Con- 
sistency in this sense is akin to the notion of “ universalizability ” in 
the moral philosophy of R. M. Hare s9 and to the “ original posi- 
tion” of John Rawls.’ In this sense it is not a mere philosophical 
procedure but a process to be valued and which, like the controver- 
sial rights it produces, should be taken seriously.2 
MAX WEAVER * 
913 Dworkin himself says, “The  same phrase might describe a right within one 
theory and a goal within another ”; see TRS, p. 92. 
97 TRS, pp. 134-136. 
98 See Trubeck op. cir., p. 544. Galanter, op. cit. (1974) at p. 145, points out 
that “‘unreform’-that is ambiguity and overload of rules, overloaded and in- 
efficient institutional facilities, disparities in the supply of legal services, and 
and disparities in the strategic position of par t iee i s  the foundation of the ‘ dualism ’ 
of the legal system. It permits unification and universalism a t  the symbolic level and 
diversity and particularism at the operating level.” Abel, in ‘‘ A Comparative Theory 
of Dispute Institutions in Society ” (1973) 8 Law and Society Review 217, 288, also 
comments, ‘‘ social heterogeneity compels the development of more abstract, more 
universal, norms capable of reconciling the values of different segments of the 
population.” 
99 Up. cir. pp. 10-13 and 193-198. 
1 Up. cir. (1972), pp. 118-192; the parallels between Hare and Rawls are noted by 
U.B. (London). Head of the Division of Law, Polytechnic of the South Bank. 
Barry, op. cit., pp. 10-14. Dworkin discusses Rawls in TRS, pp. 150-183. 
2 TRS, pp. 184-205 and 279-290. 
